Applying a model of the multioutput firm, econometric results are reported for irrigated production in four multistate regions of the American West. Cross-sectional microdata from the Farm and Ranch Irrigation Survey and limited-dependent variable methods are used to estimate crop-choice, supply, land allocation, and water demand functions for field crops. Farm-level water demand is decomposed into the sum of crop-level water demands, and crop-level demands are further separated into an extensive margin (land allocations) and intensive margin (short-run water use). Response to water price (measured as groundwater pumping cost) occurs primarily at the extensive margin.
Producers engaged in irrigated agriculture make a variety of decisions concerning cropchoice, land use, and irrigation water application.' A producer chooses which crops to grow from a set of m irrigated field crops common to a region. Each producer typically grows two or more crops, yet does not necessarily grow all m crops. Thus, the crop-choice decision can be studied independently as a discrete choice. Along with the crop-choice decision, the producer decides the quantity of cropland to allocate to each crop. In this sense, crop-choice and land-use decisions follow a two-part description of behavior: decisions are decomposed into whether to "participate" in growing a crop and how much acreage of land to allocate to the crop given participation (Maddala, Chap. 9). Crop supply decisions are treated similarly. As an irrigator, the producer also makes crop-level water decisions; these are conditional on land allocations, thus reflecting water use within an irrigation season. The crop-choice, land allocation, and supply decisions are modeled as relatively long-run decisions, while crop-level water demand is modeled as a short-run decision.
Model
The model applies the theory of the multioutput competitive firm to a farm enterprise engaged in irrigated production. We assume input nonjointness in production and a farm-level constraint on land with irrigation infrastructure. Input nonjointness enables characterization of crop-level profit functions. Irrigation water is a variable input since groundwater is available to the farms as the marginal water source. Marginal cost of groundwater pumping serves as the measure of water price (as in Caswell and Zilberman; Negri and Brooks; Nieswiadomy; Ogg and Gollehon).
The following notation and assumptions apply: p is a vector of crop prices; pi is the price of crop i, i = 1, ..., m; r is a vector of variable input prices except for water price; b is the irrigation water price; N is the land constraint; x is a vector of other variables exogenous to the farm or crop (climate, weather, soil quality, and irrigation technology); ni is the land allocated to crop i; wi is the irrigation water applied to crop i; y, is the output of crop i; I-(p, r, b, N; x) is the multioutput profit function; and Gri(pi, r, b, ni; x) is the crop-level restricted profit function of crop i. The ri(pi, r, b, ni; x) are assumed convex and homogeneous of degree one in pi, r, and b, nondecreasing in pi and n, and nonincreasing in r and b. Producers take prices as given.
The study applies the normalized quadratic profit function as the form of the crop-specific restricted profit functions. The normalized quadratic is a flexible functional form (Lau) , and has been applied previously to multioutput agricultural production research (e.g., Huffman, Shumway). Its full specification includes linear, squared, and cross-product terms for all exog- Note three general items illustrated by the choice functions. First, in models assuming input nonjointness, nonzero cross-price effects signal the apparent jointness created by fixed, allocatable inputs (Chambers and Just; Shumway, Pope, and Nash). With the current model, the output-price terms in the supply functions and the land allocation functions illustrate the jointness created by the fixed land input. Second, the supply and land allocation functions also capture information on possible output substitutions in response to water price. Finally, the water demand and land allocation functions show a strength of assuming input nonjointness: crop-level land and water use data can be utilized econometrically. With input jointness, in contrast, the multioutput profit function does not decompose into crop-specific profit functions. Only farm-level variable input demand functions can be specified and estimated as a consequence.
Decomposing Farm-level Water Demand
This research emphasizes the role of water price as a determinant of producer decisions because of its importance to water conservation policy. With farm-level data, only farm-level water demand of multicrop producers can be analyzed. With crop-level data, in contrast, farm-level water demand can be decomposed into the sum of crop-specific water demands. Moreover, crop-level water use can be further separated into analysis of the extensive margin of water use (the land allocation decision) and the intensive margin of water use (short-run water demand).
This depiction of the effect of price on decisions can be shown analytically by first representing farm-level water use (W) using the water demand and land allocation equations 
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In this way, crop-level response decomposes into an intensive margin (a direct effect operating through short-run water demand) and an extensive margin (an indirect effect operating through land reallocation). Summing over the m crops results in the farm-level response. Equation (10) shows that the total effect of a price increase on crop-level water use may be positive or negative. According to comparative static results, the intensive margin should decrease in price. Yet, the extensive margin may increase or decrease depending on the sign of ni*/lab. The total farm-level effect, i.e., summing across crops, should be that farm-level water demand decreases in water price.
Data and Econometric Methods

Data and Variables
The econometric analysis compares two types of multicrop producers distinguished by the set of irrigated field crops being produced. 
Econometric Methods
The availability of microdata on multicrop production presents an issue concerning application of an unbiased estimator.4 To produce unbiased estimates, limited-dependent variable econometric models must be applied because many farms do not produce some of the crops in a multicrop system. Producers in the sample used here grow two or more of five field crops, with a value of zero representing a lower threshold for output, land use, and water use.
We apply two common approaches for analysis of limited-dependent variables, the Tobit model and the Heckman model (Maddala, p.
149-56 and p. 231-34).One major distinction between the Tobit and Heckman models concerns the exogenous variables explaining the quantity decision (Maddala; Bockstael et al.).
In the Tobit model, the same set of exogenous variables explains both the participation and the quantity decisions. Behaviorally, the relatively long-run nature of the crop supply functions and land allocation functions is consistent with the Tobit. Farm-level exogenous variables (e.g., farm-level irrigation technology and climate) influence both the participation and quantity decisions. In the Heckman model, in contrast, the set of exogenous variables varies across decisions. Choices associated with short-run water demand are consistent with the Heckman model. The discrete decision to use water is affected by variables that also influence irrigated land allocation: a decision to allocate land to a crop means that irrigation water will be applied to that crop. Yet the quantity of water used during the irrigation season depends on short-run variables, including crop-level irrigation technology and weather.
Thus, the land allocation and supply functions [equations (3) and (7)] are estimated with the Tobit. The water demand functions [equa-3 To compute a water price for each farm observation, energy cost for each fuel source is computed from farm-level FRIS data on groundwater pumping depth and pumping pressure (see table 1) by applying the formula (Gilley and Supalla, p. 1785): C = P*(1.3716/E)*(L + 2.31*PSI),where C=groundwater pumping cost in $/acre-foot, P=fuel price, E=fuel efficiency, L=distance in feet that groundwater is lifted from the water table, PSI=pumping pressure in pounds per square inch, and 1.3716 and 2.31 are constants. Units for P and E correspond according to fuel type. In the computation, costs by fuel source (natural gas, LP gas, electricity, diesel, and gasoline) are combined based on farm acres served by each fuel. Variation in pumping depth, pressure, and fuel sources, along with differences in fuel prices, translate into variation in the water price variable.
4A second issue concerns efficient estimates. With multioutput systems, "...efficient econometric estimation generally requires estimation of a seemingly unrelated multiple-product system" (Shumway, Pope, and Nash, p. 75). System estimation techniques, however, are not available for limited-dependent variable models. Thus, we apply single-equation models to obtain unbiased estimates. 
Chow Tests for Structural Differences Across Regions
The Chow tests examine rigorously the issue of whether similarities in cropping pattern among irrigators in different regions translate into structural similarities in observed output and input decisions. In effect, the tests examine whether parameters of a multioutput technology are constant across regions. The experiment here is interesting because the five-crop cropping pattern is held constant across regions.
For every crop and its four estimated equations, the Chow tests are applied across the Northwest and Central Plains regions and, independently, across the Southwest and Southern Plains regions. The tests are implemented as likelihood ratio tests (via a X2 test) for equations estimated with maximum likelihood procedures (crop-choice, land allocation, and supply) and as an F test for equations estimated with OLS (water demand, since the Heckman uses OLS in its second stage). The null hypothesis for the tests is that the parameters are constant across regions.
Almost universally, the results reject the null 5 Note that the land allocation equations and water demand equations do not need to be estimated as a simultaneous equation system. This set of equations is diagonally recursive (Kmenta, p. 586). Here, diagonally recursive means that, while crop-level water use depends on crop-level land allocation, the reverse is not true. This situation thus creates no particular problem, e.g., ordinary-least-squares estimates are unbiased and efficient with a diagonally recursive system. hypothesis.6 Consider first the structural comparisons across the two northern regions. The null hypothesis of no structural differences across the Northwest and Central Plains regions is rejected at the 0.01 significance level for each of the fifteen equations representing relatively long-run decisions (crop-choice, supply, and land allocation). In the short-run water demand equations, the null hypothesis of no differences across regions is rejected at the 0.01 level for three of five crops. The exceptions are alfalfa and barley water demands, for which the null hypothesis cannot be rejected at the 0.01 level.
The comparisons across the southern regions also yield strong statistical evidence of structural differences across the Southwest and Southern Plains regions. Every null hypothesis of no structural difference across the two regions is rejected at the 0.01 significance level.
The Chow tests show clearly that, even with identical cropping patterns, region-specific estimation of choice equations is generally appropriate. This conclusion is consistent with Polson and Shumway's findings on the structure of technology across states in the southcentral U.S.
Water Price as a Determinant of Producer Decisions: Evidence for Four Western Regions
The following section focuses on the performance of water price to distill the key results from the equations: eighty equations (twenty equations per region) are estimated by applying (1), (3), (7), and (8).
General Empirical Findings
The econometric results produce four general findings. For context here, refer to table 2 for two items: (a) elasticities with respect to water price, based on the eighty estimated equations, and (b) statistical significance of the eighty estimated coefficients for the water price variables. Finding 1. In the decomposition of crop-level water demand into extensive and intensive margins, water price is significant at the extensive margin in fourteen of twenty optimal land allocation equations, but is universally statistically insignificant at the intensive margin of shortrun water demand.
Two general patterns are clear. One, water price was not negative and significant in any of twenty short-run water demand equations.' After choosing cropland allocations, water price simply does not affect producers' short-run water use.
This important result indicates that, in terms of the effect of water price on multicrop profits, the major impact occurs through crop-choice, irrigation technology, and land allocation decisions. Once cropland is allocated, the level of water price appears not to have a major quantitative impact on profit; otherwise, water price would be a significant determinant of short-run water use. This result also implies that, for price-induced water conservation to be effective, it must rely on responses through cropland allocation or irrigation technology adoption.
Two alternative models may explain producer decisions on short-run water use better than the variable input model. A "behavioral" model (Just et al. 1990 ) relates water use primarily to acreage in the crop. According to this model, producers apply a fixed water-land ratio in the short-run.8 Second, a fixed, allocatable input model offers a more complex model of multicrop decisions than the behavioral model. In this model, producers operate with a shortrun constraint on farm-level water use because of fixed groundwater pumping capacity. This constraint invokes a competition among crops for water. Both alternative models are consistent with the notion that, once acreage decisions are made at the start of the season, water price does not affect water use.
The second general pattern is that, although the extensive margin responds to water price, this is not universally true for all crops. In three of four regions, adjustments in land allocation occur for some, but not all, crops. The Southern Plains is the exception, with the water price 6 A table reporting crop-specific results for the Chow tests is available from the authors. 7 The Heckman model can create multicollinearity problems by introducing the variable used to correct for selectivity bias (Bockstael, et al.) . To assess whether the weak statistical performance of the water price variables was caused by multicollinearity, the Cragg model was estimated as an alternative to the Heckman. The Cragg model does not introduce multicollinearity. In estimates using the Cragg model, the water price variables were also statistically insignificant at the 0.10 level. Note that responsiveness to water price can be viewed as farm-level land reallocations that would occur with an increase in price. In every region, some land allocations increase in price while others decrease. This is consistent with theory, as the farm-level land constraint requires that coefficients sum to 0 within a region. Empirically, of course, crops with different water requirements should tend to be substitutes. This occurs in the Southwest, for example, where alfalfa acreage declines in water price while cotton acreage increases for the sample analyzed.
Finding 2. The majority of responses to water price at the extensive margin are moderately to highly inelastic.
We found that twelve of twenty land allocation elasticities with respect to water price fall below 0.5 in absolute value, indicating limited response to water price in general. Three crops respond elastically in certain regions, however: barley in the Central Plains, and alfalfa and cotton in the Southern Plains.
Finding 3. For an individual crop in a particular region (e.g., alfalfa in the Northwest), the sign and statistical significance of water price generally is very similar in determining relatively long-run decisions across the cropchoice, land allocation, and crop supply equations.
The three relatively long-run equations perform comparably with respect to water price. Across the three equations for a given crop and region, the sign on water price is identical and the statistical significance is similar (with fourteen of twenty significant coefficients for the land allocation and crop supply equations, and fifteen of twenty significant coefficients for the cropchoice equations, all evaluated at the 0.10 significance level). In particular, both the magnitude of the elasticity and the significance of the underlying water price estimates are closely comparable across land allocation and supply equations. Alfalfa illustrates this vividly. By re- This correspondence between land allocation and supply provides useful information on output substitution in response to water price. In principle, output substitution should be analyzed with supply functions. As demonstrated here, however, the land allocation elasticities offer a de facto surrogate for supply response for the case of these irrigated field crops. This finding shows the importance of accounting for structural differences across regions. The analysis holds constant the five crops produced in the northern regions. Still, barley switches from a crop whose long-run decisions increase in water price in the Northwest to the opposite in the Central Plains. Corn, wheat, cotton, sorghum, and (to a degree) dry beans also exhibit this finding.
The lone exception to the finding is alfalfa, a crop with heavy water requirements. Producers clearly substitute away from alfalfa production in the face of higher water prices.
Decomposing Farm-level Water Demand
Examining the relationship between farm-level water demand and crop-level water demands involves decomposing farm-level water demand into the sum of crop-level water demands, and then further decomposing crop-level demand into intensive and extensive margins of water use. Equation (10) states this succinctly for a given change in water price. This equation is applied in each of the four regions to assess response to a water price change.
The basic elements of farm-level water demand consist of the estimated coefficients on water price in the land allocation and short-run water demand equations: a marginal change in short-run water use given a change in water price (awi/ab), a change in short-run water use given a change in land use (dw;/dnn), and a change in land use given a change in water price (dnl/db), for every crop, i = 1 -5. Using (10), we combine the elements in three steps to assemble farm-level water demand: (a) multi- 9 Even though the coefficients on water price (dwi/db) are statistically insignificant in the short-run water demand equations, they still represent statistically unbiased estimates and, thus, can be used as appropriate predictors of behavior.
to Coefficients from both the Tobit and Heckman models must be adjusted before they are used to interpret observed behavior. Because the Tobit specifies a latent variable framework for the dependent variable, its coefficients represent marginal changes in the latent, rather than the observed, variable. Because the second stage of the Heckman uses only nonlimit observations, its coefficients represent only those producers who grow the crop rather than the entire sample. Finding 5 establishes the dominance of the extensive margin. Table 3 shows that the coefficients on water price in the land allocation equations, dn/ldb, determine this finding for most cases. These coefficients, most of which exceed 4 in absolute value, serve as a strong magnifying effect on the extensive margin. In contrast, the influence of the limited-dependent variable regression models serves as a contractionary effect on the extensive margin; multiplying through by the share of the sample growing the crop [F(x)i] diminishes the final product for the extensive margin. The previous section already reported that land allocations functions can substitute for crop supply functions in analysis of output substitution. In the Northwest, the land allocation results indicate that a higher water price would induce substitution of barley and dry bean acreage and output for alfalfa acreage and output. This depiction appears reasonable, as it describes a substitution of crops with low water requirements for a crop with a high water requirement. Other specific results with the land allocation equations follow (table 4) 
Summary and Conclusions
We analyzed several responses to water scarcity that are available to multicrop producers in irrigated agriculture. A multioutput production 13 The coefficients should not be interpreted as the water used on the additional acre of land. For the case of corn, for instance, the coefficient implies that, with an increase of one acre in corn acreage, 2.96 additional acre-feet of water are applied to total corn acreage. In other words, the total amount of water increases by 2.96, and the new total water will be applied over the new total amount of acreage. Average water application rates will change only slightly in response to the marginal increase in water use created by a marginal increase in acreage. Two key empirical findings on the role of water price illustrate new insight into multioutput producer behavior in the western United States. One, observed activity at the farm-level masks crop-level adjustments. For example, farmlevel water use typically declines in water price, yet crop-level water use declines in water price for some crops and increases for other crops. Further, farm-level water use responds very inelastically, while land allocation responses generally create much more elastic responses in crop-level water use. Two, in the context of irrigated field crop production, producers respond to water price at the extensive margin of water use (crop-choice and land allocation decisions) rather than the intensive margin (short-run water use decisions). Water price, in fact, is not negative in sign and statistically significant in explaining short-run water demand in any of twenty estimated equations. These two empirical findings indicate the richer description of producer behavior that becomes possible with crop-level microdata.
The econometric analysis also finds that, even while holding the set of crops constant in a multioutput context, structural differences in the estimated equations exist across regions. These results indicate that transferring econometric results across regions should be done cautiously.
Several limitations of the analysis are noted. First, the estimated parameters and elasticities cannot necessarily be used in more aggregate models of irrigated production. The sample used in the study applies only to multicrop producers who grow the set of crops analyzed. Second, our study does not pertain directly to producers who irrigate solely with surface water. Results may not be transferrable to this class of irrigators. Third, variables for crop prices, gasoline price, and wages have little cross-sectional variation. Instead, variation in these variables came from a two-year time series. Additional years of data should produce more accurate estimates for these variables.
At least two items of future research are important. Our empirical results can be extended to develop two components of a welfare analysis of water price increases: using the crop supply estimates to measure the change in producer's surplus from a price increase, and applying the farm-level water elasticities to provide estimates of water conservation from a price increase. Lastly, alternative models of short-run input use in multicrop systems can be formally compared to the present paper's variable input model. The ineffectiveness of water price suggests that an acreage-based model or a fixed, allocatable input model of water use may better explain short-run decisions.
[Received October 1992; final revision received March 1994.]
